Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule
CC BY
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Định dạng: | Sách |
Ngôn ngữ: | English |
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Springer
2023
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Truy cập trực tuyến: | https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13389-021-00279-2 https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/7400 |
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oai:localhost:PNK-74002023-03-31T08:51:03Z Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule Andreas, Wiemers Johannes, Mittmann DES XOR CC BY Recent publications consider side-channel attacks against the key schedule of the Data Encryption Standard (DES). These publications identify a leakage model depending on the XOR of register values in the DES key schedule. Building on this leakage model, we first revisit a discrete model which assumes that the Hamming distances between subsequent round keys leak without error. We analyze this model formally and provide theoretical explanations for observations made in previous works. Next we examine a continuous model which considers more points of interest and also takes noise into account. 2023-03-31T08:51:03Z 2023-03-31T08:51:03Z 2023 Book https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13389-021-00279-2 https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/7400 en application/pdf Springer |
institution |
Digital Phenikaa |
collection |
Digital Phenikaa |
language |
English |
topic |
DES XOR |
spellingShingle |
DES XOR Andreas, Wiemers Johannes, Mittmann Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule |
description |
CC BY |
format |
Book |
author |
Andreas, Wiemers Johannes, Mittmann |
author_facet |
Andreas, Wiemers Johannes, Mittmann |
author_sort |
Andreas, Wiemers |
title |
Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule |
title_short |
Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule |
title_full |
Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule |
title_fullStr |
Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule |
title_full_unstemmed |
Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule |
title_sort |
improving recent side-channel attacks against the des key schedule |
publisher |
Springer |
publishDate |
2023 |
url |
https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13389-021-00279-2 https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/7400 |
_version_ |
1761912527800762368 |
score |
8.891787 |