Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule

CC BY

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Andreas, Wiemers, Johannes, Mittmann
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Springer 2023
Subjects:
DES
XOR
Online Access:https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13389-021-00279-2
https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/7400
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spelling oai:localhost:PNK-74002023-03-31T08:51:03Z Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule Andreas, Wiemers Johannes, Mittmann DES XOR CC BY Recent publications consider side-channel attacks against the key schedule of the Data Encryption Standard (DES). These publications identify a leakage model depending on the XOR of register values in the DES key schedule. Building on this leakage model, we first revisit a discrete model which assumes that the Hamming distances between subsequent round keys leak without error. We analyze this model formally and provide theoretical explanations for observations made in previous works. Next we examine a continuous model which considers more points of interest and also takes noise into account. 2023-03-31T08:51:03Z 2023-03-31T08:51:03Z 2023 Book https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13389-021-00279-2 https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/7400 en application/pdf Springer
institution Digital Phenikaa
collection Digital Phenikaa
language English
topic DES
XOR
spellingShingle DES
XOR
Andreas, Wiemers
Johannes, Mittmann
Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule
description CC BY
format Book
author Andreas, Wiemers
Johannes, Mittmann
author_facet Andreas, Wiemers
Johannes, Mittmann
author_sort Andreas, Wiemers
title Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule
title_short Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule
title_full Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule
title_fullStr Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule
title_full_unstemmed Improving recent side-channel attacks against the DES key schedule
title_sort improving recent side-channel attacks against the des key schedule
publisher Springer
publishDate 2023
url https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13389-021-00279-2
https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/7400
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score 8.887836