Evolution, Investment, and Bargaining

CC BY

Lưu vào:
Hiển thị chi tiết
Tác giả chính: Jack, Robles
Định dạng: Sách
Ngôn ngữ:English
Nhà xuất bản: Springer 2023
Chủ đề:
Truy cập trực tuyến:https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13235-023-00499-7
https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/7485
Từ khóa: Thêm từ khóa
Không có từ khóa, Hãy là người đầu tiên đánh dấu biểu ghi này!
id oai:localhost:PNK-7485
record_format dspace
spelling oai:localhost:PNK-74852023-04-04T04:43:57Z Evolution, Investment, and Bargaining Jack, Robles impact relationship-specific investment bargaining game CC BY We present an evolutionary model which allows us to study the impact relationship-specific investment has on bargaining. Agents are matched to play an investment and bargaining game. During bargaining, agents have an outside option to form a new relationship, but in exercising this option loses their current investment. We find that the stochastically stable post-investment bargaining convention is dependent on the cost of investment. In particular, the larger the cost of investment, the lower is the share of gross surplus that is received. This stands in contrast with previous studies. In addition, we find that there is under-investment. We disentangle the forces which lead to these two results. 2023-04-04T04:43:57Z 2023-04-04T04:43:57Z 2023 Book https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13235-023-00499-7 https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/7485 en application/pdf Springer
institution Digital Phenikaa
collection Digital Phenikaa
language English
topic impact relationship-specific investment
bargaining game
spellingShingle impact relationship-specific investment
bargaining game
Jack, Robles
Evolution, Investment, and Bargaining
description CC BY
format Book
author Jack, Robles
author_facet Jack, Robles
author_sort Jack, Robles
title Evolution, Investment, and Bargaining
title_short Evolution, Investment, and Bargaining
title_full Evolution, Investment, and Bargaining
title_fullStr Evolution, Investment, and Bargaining
title_full_unstemmed Evolution, Investment, and Bargaining
title_sort evolution, investment, and bargaining
publisher Springer
publishDate 2023
url https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s13235-023-00499-7
https://dlib.phenikaa-uni.edu.vn/handle/PNK/7485
_version_ 1762274898938429440
score 8.891145